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You’re Fired: Pack Everything but Your
Social Media Passwords
By Hugh McLaughlin*
The global proliferation of social media has transformed these online platforms—once
used almost exclusively by young, tech-savvy Millennials—into transcontinental mediums
of communication and expression. Through social media, dictatorships have been
overthrown, human rights abuses have been exposed, and the oppressed have been given
a voice. The social and cultural impact has been truly prolific. But until recently, social
media’s economic impact was less clear. Now, though, myriad evidence—ranging from
studies focusing on revenue generated from a single Facebook “Like,” to commentary
positing that trillions of dollars in value have yet to be realized—indicates the potential
commercial advantages stemming from social media’s use. With over one-billion users
worldwide, the small percentage of companies not using social media to market and
maintain relationships will likely face difficulty competing with companies that
adequately utilize these inexpensive platforms.
But while social media’s place in commerce is now established, the legal consequences of
its misuse in the workplace are nebulous. Courts and legislatures have struggled to
balance the competing interests of business autonomy and employees’ privacy rights,
ultimately resulting in a patchwork of judicial holdings and reactive legislation. And with
little guidance from courts, companies have struggled to adapt to the ever-changing
social media landscape. Thus, companies are attempting to navigate the legal thicket by
drafting explicitly restrictive social media policies that protect business interests.
This legal ambiguity has prompted a recent trend in employment-contract drafting that
threatens to disrupt social media’s market potential. These new provisions effectively
force employees to turn over social media passwords to their employers upon termination
of employment. At first blush, this practice might seem innocuous. This Comment argues
that it is anything but. Coupled with a balancing of the equities approach, an analysis of
pertinent principles of contract, privacy, and tort law shows that employees’ rights
should prevail. As a matter of law and equity, an employee’s right to retain access to her
social media accounts post-termination should be assured through a judicial prohibition
of these overly intrusive employment provisions.
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INTRODUCTION
¶1

The global proliferation of social media has transformed these online platforms—
once used almost exclusively by young, tech-savvy Millennials1—into transcontinental
mediums of communication and expression. Through social media, dictatorships have
been overthrown,2 human rights abuses have been exposed,3 and the oppressed have been
given a voice.4 The social and cultural impact has been truly prolific. But until recently,
social media’s economic impact was less clear. Now, though, myriad evidence—ranging

1

For example, Facebook initially required a Harvard.edu email address. Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B.
Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, & Scholarship, 13 J. OF COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM.
210, 218 (2008).
2
See Catherine O’Donnell, New Study Quantifies Use of Social Media in Arab Spring, UNIV. OF WASH.
(Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.washington.edu/news/2011/09/12/new-study-quantifies-use-of-social-mediain-arab-spring/.
3
See Christoph Koettl, Twitter to the Rescue? How Social Media Is Transforming Human Rights
Monitoring, HUMAN RIGHTS NOW BLOG (Feb. 20, 2013, 4:34 PM), http://blog.amnestyusa.org/middleeast/twitter-to-the-rescue-how-social-media-is-transforming-human-rights-monitoring/.
4
See Phelim Kine, Chinese Government’s Oppressive Policies Draw Ire from the Public, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/03/chinese-governments-oppressivepolicies-draw-ire-public.
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from studies focusing on revenue generated from a single Facebook “Like,”5 to
commentary positing that trillions of dollars in value have yet to be realized6—indicates
the potential commercial advantages stemming from social media’s use. With over onebillion users worldwide, the small percentage of companies not using social networking
services (SNSs), such as LinkedIn, Facebook, and Twitter, to market and maintain
relationships will face difficulty competing with companies that adequately utilize these
inexpensive platforms.7
However, a recent trend in employment-contract drafting threatens to disrupt social
media’s market potential. These new provisions effectively force employees to turn over
social media passwords to their employers upon termination of employment.8 In other
words, these restrictive social media policies compel employees to assign their social
media access rights to the company. At first blush, this practice might seem innocuous.
This Comment argues that it is anything but. Coupled with a balancing of the equities
approach, an analysis of pertinent principles of contract, privacy, and tort law shows that
employees’ rights should prevail. As a matter of law and equity, an employee’s right to
retain access to her social media account post-termination should be ensured through a
judicial prohibition of these overly intrusive employment provisions.
Because it is important to understand the uneasy intersection of law and social
media, this Comment begins with a basic overview. Part I addresses the unclear legal
landscape regarding social media in the workplace and analyzes the importance of social
media’s use to employees generally. Part II begins the substantive argument looking to
the most prominent SNSs—Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn—and the similar
contractual provisions in their user agreements specifically defining this employment
practice as a breach of contract. However, because courts have suggested that employers
may assert legal ownership over individual employee accounts, Part III addresses the
most relevant case, Eagle v. Morgan,9 delving into the court’s reasoning and pertinent
dicta. Part IV analyzes the suitability of privacy law protection in Eagle and generally.
Part V discusses the inherently public nature of social media and the inapplicability of
trade-secret law. Part VI analyzes the judicial and legislative trends favoring employee
social media rights. Finally, Part VII offers a socioeconomic justification addressing the
actual and potential value of social media, and how this should impact judicial analysis
and SNS decision-making.
Recognizing that no legal principle adequately addresses the alienability of social
media accounts in the workplace, this Comment provides a roadmap for courts to balance
5

See Jim Edwards, What Is a Facebook “Like” Actually Worth in Dollars, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 27,
2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-a-facebook-like-actually-worth-in-dollars-2013-3 (citing
multiple studies focusing on the value of Facebook “Likes”).
6
See MICHAEL CHUI ET AL., MCKINSEY INST., THE SOCIAL ECONOMY: UNLOCKING VALUE AND
PRODUCTIVITY THROUGH SOCIAL TECHNOLOGIES 9 (2012) [hereinafter SOCIAL ECONOMY], available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high_tech_telecoms_internet/the_social_economy.
7
See id. at 51.
8
See, e.g., Eagle v. Morgan, Civil Action No. 11–4303, 2013 WL 943350 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013). See
Jennifer L. Parent, Advising Clients on Today’s Top Employment Law Issues, ASPATORE, Feb. 2013, at 5,
and Sara Hutchins Jodka, Arm Yourself: Battle over Social Media Account Ownership Has Begun, 23
OHIO. EMP. L. LETTER, Oct. 2012, at 1, for discussions suggesting employers draft and implement
employment policies asserting company ownership over employee social media accounts.
9
Eagle, 2013 WL 943350.
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the equities, along with a supplemental call-to-arms for SNS intervention. Taking into
account the factors outlined infra, the equitable scale of justice weighs in favor of a
judge-made rule prohibiting the enforcement of employment provisions that assert
company ownership over employee social media accounts.
I.
¶5

¶6

¶7

¶8

BACKGROUND OF SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE LAW

It is now easier than ever to expand one’s professional network, maintain
relationships, and communicate instantly.10 Over 72% of companies use social media,
and one study estimates that the global economy has yet to realize trillions of dollars in
value created by social media’s use.11 Even assuming a more conservative valuation,
capable parties will undoubtedly seek out ways to maximize gains before others attempt
the same. Thus, social media’s eventual value may not depend primarily upon overall
usage, but rather upon which parties are best able to capture its current, unrealized
economic potential.12
On the other hand, social media platforms are inherently interpersonal. They are
“social” after all. They give people an avenue to express their thoughts freely, share
personal experiences with loved ones, and revitalize long-lost friendships. A truly global
community now exists due to social media’s proliferation.
Problems arise, though, when seemingly temporary communication becomes
permanent, or when the ease of usage allows someone to do something in the heat of a
moment that he later regrets.13 Further, the often-blurred line between the “social” aspects
of social media and its professional use in the workplace exacerbates these issues.14
While social media’s place in commerce is now established,15 the legal
consequences of its misuse are nebulous. With little guidance from courts, companies
have struggled to adapt to the ever-changing social media landscape.16 From screening
job applicants’ Facebook profiles,17 to combatting trade-secret theft by ex-employees,18
10

See Robert Ball, Social Media Marketing: What’s the Payoff for Your Business, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 24, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-ball/do-you-know-how-socialme_b_826802.html.
11
See SOCIAL ECONOMY, supra note 6.
12
While over a billion Internet users frequent social media websites, the unrealized financial growth
supports the proposition that total usage statistics may not accurately gauge social media’s current value.
See id.; see cf. Ken Strutin, Social Media and the Vanishing Points of Ethical and Constitutional
Boundaries, 31 PACE L. REV. 228, 237 (2011) (describing social media’s use in prison in that “the value of
a communication/information source is measured by the need to control access to it”).
13
See Jennifer L. Naeger, United States: Effectively Managing Social Media in the Workplace, MONDAQ
(May 15, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/239152/employee+rights+labour+relations/
EFFECTIVELY+MANAGING+SOCIAL+MEDIA+IN+THE+WORKPLACE.
14
See id.; Jodka, supra note 8.
15
See SOCIAL ECONOMY, supra note 6.
16
See John Balitis, Jr. & Carrie Pixler Ryerson, Social Media’s Lessons, 48 ARIZ. ATT’Y 17, 17 (Apr.
2012) (“In 2012, as more and more employers are using social media for their own gain, a new controversy
has emerged. Employers now are embroiled in litigation against former employees over the issue
of who owns social media pages and accounts: the employer or the employee.”).
17
See Sara E. Stratton, Note, Passwords Please: Rethinking the Constitutional Right to Informational
Privacy in the Context of Social Media, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 649, 649 (2014).
18
E.g., Phonedog v. Kravitz, No. C 11–03474 MEJ., 2011 WL 5415612, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011);
see 5A RICHARD A. ROSS, METHODS OF PRACTICE, MINN. PRAC. § 4.50.10(A) (Roger S. Haydock & Peter
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companies are attempting to navigate the legal thicket by drafting social media policies
that protect business interests without violating civil liberties19 or damaging employee
morale.20 Similarly, courts and legislatures have struggled to balance the competing
interests of business autonomy and employees’ privacy rights, ultimately resulting in a
patchwork of judicial holdings and reactive legislation.
¶9
Social media’s rapid expansion in the workplace has left courts and legislatures
attempting to cope with a myriad of disputes.21 In many ways, this new technology has
transformed once-settled areas of law into quagmires of inconsistent precedent.22 In light
of this confusion, commentators suggest that companies should draft explicitly restrictive
social media policies to protect business interests.23
¶10
Governing bodies have attempted to provide guidance through legislation. For
instance, the National Labor Relations Act protects certain employee privacy rights on
social media,24 while multiple states have statutorily banned companies from asking
employees for social media passwords.25 Although statutes and agency regulations have
provided some direction for corporate governance, companies are still searching for
answers that often do not exist. Ultimately, the judiciary needs to find a way to rectify
these issues consistently.
¶11
Unfortunately, few courts have been able to provide much clarity. The way courts
have decided many of these issues has been at best inconsistent and at worst incoherent.
Often judges seem to shove square pegs into round holes, relying on statutes like the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), drafted nearly three decades ago, to justify
decisions concerning an issue never contemplated by the drafters of such legislation.26 In

B. Knapp eds., 4th ed. 2013); Jodka, supra note 8.
19
See ROSS, supra note 18; Kathy Ossian, Protecting Sensitive Information in Cyberspace: Recent
Trends and Recommended Strategies, ASPATORE, Aug. 2013, at 1.
20
See Mickie Kennedy, The Case Against Creating a Corporate Social Media Policy, ERELEASES,
http://www.ereleases.com/prfuel/against-creating-corporate-social-media-policy (last visited Sept. 18,
2014).
21
See Michael Masri & Pedram Tabibi, Social Media at Work Raises Issues of Account Ownership,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 26, 2012, at 11–12.
22
See Ashley Kasarjian, The Social Media Checklist for Companies: What Your Clients Should Do,
Know and Learn, 49 ARIZ. ATT’Y 16 (Mar. 2013).
23
See, e.g., id.; Masri & Tabibi, supra note 21, at 12; Bethany N. Whitfield, Comment, Social Media @
Work: #POLICYNEEDED, 66 ARK. L. REV. 843, 847 (2013) (citing Maureen Minehan, Protect Social
Media Assets from Departing Employees, EMP. ALERT, Mar. 21, 2012, at 1, available at http://www.
dinsmore.com/files/upload/socialmediaassets.pdf).
24
See Kasarjian, supra note 22, at 18 (citing NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., REPORT OF THE ACTING
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2012), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/newsoutreach/news-story/acting-general-counsel-releases-report-employer-social-media-policies).
25
See id.
26
18 U.S.C. § 1030(g); see, e.g., Eagle v. Morgan, Civil Action No. 11–4303, 2012 WL 4739436, at *5
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012), aff’d, Eagle v. Morgan, Civil Action No. 11–4303, 2013 WL 943350 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 12, 2013) (holding that damages under the CFAA must result from actual loss, not potential business
opportunities); P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party & Seasonal Superstore, 428 F.3d 504 (3d Cir.
2005); see also Andrew T. Hernacki, A Vague Law in a Smartphone World: Limiting the Scope of
Unauthorized Access Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1543, 1547 (2012)
(arguing, inter alia, that an overly broad application of the CFAA is unconstitutionally vague, thus its scope
should be limited to the original legislative goal of it being an “anti-hacking” statute).
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this same vein, an overreliance on intellectual property law27 and state common-law
doctrines has led to similar vagaries.28
¶12
These holdings are as unpredictable as they are confusing. Simply put, there are
very few standards dealing with social media rights in the workplace for courts to rely
upon. Even less guidance exists to help companies shape viable social media policies.29
Due to this lack of clarity, disputes between employers and employees have been
numerous and incredibly varied.30
¶13
Moreover, when courts have confronted social media disputes in the workplace, the
inquiries have been excessively fact-intensive.31 Realistically, no cure-all likely exists for
the multitude of issues faced. While the task is daunting, only a piecemeal process
addressing specific scenarios related to social media in the workplace appears to offer
adequate, albeit meticulous, remedies. Thus, this Comment addresses the narrow issue of
whether courts should enforce employment contracts that mandate the transfer of
individual, employee-created social media accounts upon termination.
¶14
These ownership rights are crucial for the ex-employee because often the only
contact information for individuals in a professional network is stored within these social
media accounts.32 Furthermore, even if an individual is able to collect the information
27

These forced-transfer provisions allow companies to replace the former employee’s account
information with a new company representative’s information. Thus, the resulting “likelihood of
confusion” would realistically be minimal because “there is no comparison between two competing goods”
(e.g., the different profile identities). Eagle, 2012 WL 4739436, at *7. The only way a trademark violation
under the Lanham Act would occur is if the company neglected to change the profile information, and
subsequently attempted to “pass off” the new account holder as the former employee. Id. Since this
Comment focuses on access rights to social media accounts and the insertion of a new, company-appointed
representative, the implications of trademark or copyright protection are less applicable.
28
See, e.g., Eagle, 2013 WL 943350, at *10 (discussing how the elements of conversion differ across
states, and specifically that Pennsylvania does not recognize conversion for intangible chattels, thus barring
plaintiff’s claim). See Tiffany A. Miao, Access Denied: How Social Media Accounts Fall Outside the Scope
of Intellectual Property Law and into the Realm of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 23 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1017 (2013).
29
See Steve Cosentino, Contracting and Compliance in a Web of Data Security Regulations, ASPATORE,
Mar. 2013, at 1 (“Unfortunately, because there is no central authority for these issues, lawyers must wade
through a tangled mess of laws, regulations, and standards to provide effective counsel to our clients.”).
30
See Scott Brutocao, Issue Spotting: The Multitude of Ways Social Media Impacts Employment Law
and Litigation, 60 THE ADVOC. 8, 8 (2012) (describing the various issues faced in the employment context
dealing with social media); see also ROSS, supra note 18, ¶ (B) (citations omitted) (“In addition to
considering social media policies, through the Internet, employers can learn information about employees
and potential employees that can give rise to myriad claims including: off-duty conduct claims, retaliation
claims, discrimination claims, or whistleblower claims.”).
31
See Joshua A. Mooney, Locked out on LinkedIn: LinkedIn Account Belongs to Employee, Not
Employer, 25 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 16, 18 (2013) (“The ultimate merit of such claims will be fact
intensive.”).
32
For example, in Eagle:
For many contacts, LinkedIn was the best way to keep in touch with them, particularly
because Eagle’s only email address on the account was her Edcomm address. . . . Eagle
was powerless to control how the LinkedIn account was being used; . . . [she] has still
been unable to respond to messages that were sent to the account. . . . [She] missed out on
professional opportunities by being unable to respond to these messages.
Eagle, 2012 WL 4739436, at *4.
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before leaving a company, establishing a new network is cumbersome, imperfect, and
ultimately deleterious to both the employee and the professional network.33
¶15
It is relatively clear that an ex-employee retains access rights to her individual,
password-protected account if the former employee created the account prior to gaining
such employment and the company has no explicit social media policy in place.34
However, the question becomes more difficult when the company has an employment
policy mandating specific terms of social media usage, or perhaps, an employee creates a
personal social media account at the company’s direction.35 These policies might
mandate the creation of individual social media accounts, dictate the content contained
within profiles, outline suitable information for employees to post or share, and most
importantly for this Comment, assert company ownership of a social media account upon
termination of employment.36 If both dicta in the most relevant case, Eagle v. Morgan,37
and recent commentary are any indicator,38 these restrictive social media policies will
become increasingly common.

33

See Charles Caro, Comment to How Do I Create a Second Account, LINKEDIN (Aug. 10, 2013, 4:31
PM), http://community.linkedin.com/questions/79023/how-do-i-create-a-second-account.html (describing
provisions of LinkedIn’s User Agreement not allowing second accounts to be created, and that duplicating
accounts is not beneficial due to “the nature of social networking”); Alisa Meredith, How to Recover Your
Facebook Business Page from Rogue or Clueless Employees, SCALABLE SOC. MEDIA BLOG (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://scalablesocialmedia.com/2013/02/recover-facebook-page/ (addressing the difficulties associated with
recovering information from no-longer-accessible social media accounts); see also Stephanie Sammons, 4
Tips for Improving Your Social Media Presence in 2014, WIRED ADVISOR, http://blog.wiredadvisor.com/
how-to-improve-your-social-media-presence/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014); infra text accompanying notes
179–91 (analyzing argument pointing to possibility of over-commercialization adversely affecting
invaluable community building aspects of social media).
34
Whitfield, supra note 23, at 847 (citing Maureen Minehan, Protect Social Media Assets from
Departing Employees, EMP. ALERT, Mar. 21, 2012, at 1); see, e.g., Eagle v. Morgan, Civil Action No. 11–
4303, 2013 WL 943350 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013).
35
See, e.g., Eagle, 2013 WL 943350; see Parent, supra note 8; Masri & Tabibi, supra note 21, at 12.
36
See Parent, supra note 8; Masri & Tabibi, supra note 21, at 12.
37
Edcomm’s counterclaim for misappropriation failed but for certain factors:
Edcomm never had a policy of requiring that its employees use LinkedIn, did not dictate
the precise contents of an employee’s LinkedIn account, and did not pay for its
employees’ LinkedIn accounts. Indeed, as noted above, the LinkedIn User Agreement
expressly states that Plaintiff’s account is between LinkedIn and the individual user.
Edcomm did not itself maintain any separate account. Moreover, Edcomm failed to put
forth any evidence that Eagle’s contacts list was developed and built through the
investment of Edcomm time and money as opposed to Eagle’s own time, money, and
extensive past experience. Accordingly, the Court finds in favor of Eagle on this claim.
Eagle, 2013 WL 943350, at *16.
See Kasarjian, supra note 22, at 20 (referring to Eagle, author suggests that employers should draft
specific contracts and company policies because “[i]t is important to note at the outset who owns and has a
right to view/use information, communications, and even accounts—such as LinkedIn” to best avoid
litigation); Jodka, supra note 8 (suggesting companies draft clear corporate policies that assert ownership
over all social media accounts used in relation to employment and that employee access will cease upon
termination); cf. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quan, 560 U.S. 746, 758–59 (2010) (asserting employer’s
computer policy and “operational realities” determined employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy, thus
limiting Fourth Amendment protection).
38
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¶16

This Comment argues that courts should adopt an exclusive rule prohibiting the
forced transfer of employee social media accounts via employment contracts upon
termination. This ban should apply only to individual-member accounts created in an
employee’s own name, not to public profiles created in the name of the company, such as
a “Facebook Page.”39 This restriction should apply categorically to all individual-user
accounts, regardless of whether an employee created the account before or after
employment commenced, or if the employer paid for an account upgrade. Finally, this
rule should only protect the employee’s access rights to the account and professional
network. Any content belonging to the company within the profile should still be subject
to existing valid rights, such as copyright and trademark protection.
¶17
Further, while state or federal legislation prohibiting these forced-transfer
provisions might seem sufficient, the judiciary’s inherent equity powers provide the
necessary flexibility and autonomy for reaching the most suitable result. With respect to
new technology, legislatures are often ill equipped to provide adequate solutions in an
ever-changing innovative environment. Additionally, while lawmakers might legitimately
desire a ban on forced-transfer provisions, the inevitable intervention of big-business
lobbyists supporting a company’s right to draft and enforce these provisions might cause
some politicians to balk at election time, or in the alternative, lead to watered-down,
ineffective legislation. Either way, the judiciary stands as the most capable body for
finding a solution in this context.
¶18
This Comment first argues that the textual conflict between these restrictive
employment contracts and the most common SNS user agreements should prompt a
finding that the former are facially invalid. However, although these forced-transfer
provisions appear patently impermissible, courts addressing this issue have suggested
otherwise if employees assign away their access rights.40 Thus, an analysis will follow
suggesting that if social media ownership rights do in fact exist in the employment
context, then these rights are inalienable and exclusively belong to the employee. Lastly,
the potential adverse economic and social consequences, considered in the aggregate,
should both bolster the justification for an exclusive judicial rule prohibiting forcedtransfer employment provisions and prompt SNSs to similarly oppose these agreements.
II.
¶19

OWNERSHIP RIGHTS IN SOCIAL MEDIA: CONFLICTING CONTRACTS

“The word ‘owner’ . . . means the person who has one or more interests.”41
Additionally, the term “interest” includes “a right, power, privilege, or immunity or any
two or more of these things.”42 Thus, the employer, employee, and SNS could assert
social media ownership rights concurrently. In other words, multiple parties may acquire
valid rights to different aspects of a single social media account.43
39

See Page Guidelines, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/page_guidelines.php (last visited Sept.
16, 2014).
40
See, e.g., Eagle, 2013 WL 943350, at *16.
41
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 10 (1936).
42
Id.
43
See, e.g., Help Center, LINKEDIN, http://help.linkedin.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/4783/ft/eng (last
visited Aug. 25, 2014) (“If you’re an administrator, you can: [a]dd other administrators [and] [e]dit your
Company Page.”).

94

Vol. 13:1]

Hugh McLaughlin

¶20

But the proper assignment of these rights can be less clear. Courts have struggled to
identify which party should have the right to access a social media account when multiple
parties assert contractual access rights.44 However, a textual examination of SNS user
agreements makes allocating these rights less problematic.
¶21
Although specific terms vary, the most common SNS user agreements contain
nearly identical substantive provisions. For instance, SNSs invariably retain the right to
terminate accounts at their sole discretion. Twitter’s Terms of Service state, “We reserve
the right at all times . . . to suspend or terminate users, and to reclaim usernames.”45
Similarly, “[LinkedIn] may modify, replace, refuse access to, suspend or discontinue
LinkedIn . . . for all our Members in [its] sole discretion.”46 Thus in reality, neither
employer nor employee can claim to be the true owner of a social media account since
the SNS may end the agreement at any time.47
¶22
The SNS grants a revocable license to use the service.48 LinkedIn’s User
Agreement makes it clear that “between you and others, your account belongs to you.”49
After an employee agrees to these licensing terms, the employee’s right to access the
account is superior to all but the true owner’s right—the SNS. Moreover, specific
provisions define the employee as the licensee, not the company: “If you are using
LinkedIn on behalf of a company or other legal entity, you are nevertheless individually
bound by this Agreement even if your company has a separate agreement with us.”50 In
other words, the agreement is between only the SNS and the individual setting up the
account, not the company.
¶23
Importantly, these SNS agreements explicitly forbid transferring accounts, sharing
passwords, and impersonating others, even with permission.51 LinkedIn requires that a
user “not permit others to use [the] account . . . use other’s accounts . . . [and] not sell,
trade, or transfer [a] LinkedIn account to another party.”52 Similarly, Facebook’s Terms
of Service state, “You will not share your password . . . let anyone else access your
account . . . [or] transfer your account to anyone without first getting our written

44

See, e.g., Eagle, 2013 WL 943350, at *16; Phonedog v. Kravitz, No. C 11–03474 MEJ., 2011 WL
5415612 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011).
45
Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos (last visited Aug. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Twitter
Terms].
46
User Agreement, LINKEDIN, http//www.LinkedIn.com/legal/user-agreement (last visited Aug. 25,
2014) [hereinafter LinkedIn Agreement].
47
See Twitter Terms, supra note 45.
48
Id.; see ALI PRINCIPLES OF INTELL. PROP. § 315 (Proposed Final Draft 2007).
49
LinkedIn Agreement, supra note 46.
50
Id.
51
See id. (“[Y]ou grant LinkedIn a nonexclusive, irrevocable, worldwide, perpetual, unlimited,
assignable, sublicensable, fully paid up royalty-free right to us to copy, prepare derivative works of,
improve, distribute, publish, remove, retain, add, process, analyze, use and commercialize . . . any
information you provide.”); Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.face
book.com/legal/terms (last visited Aug. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Facebook Agreement]; Twitter Terms,
supra note 45.
52
LinkedIn Agreement, supra note 46 (emphasis added). “If you are using LinkedIn on behalf of a
company or other legal entity, you are nevertheless individually bound by this Agreement even if your
company has a separate agreement with us.” Id. See Facebook Agreement, supra note 51; Twitter Terms,
supra note 45.
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permission.”53 Therefore, these agreements not only grant members the right to exclude
others from an account, but also require members to make every effort to maintain
exclusive access to that account. Simply put, exclusive access is both a right and a
contractual obligation.
¶24
LinkedIn and Facebook do not allow non-natural persons (e.g., corporations) to
have individual-member accounts. It is a violation of Facebook’s Statement of Rights and
Responsibilities to “[c]reate a [m]ember profile for anyone other than a natural person,”
and while “an employee [may] create a page for a company . . . specific parameters” must
be met.54 For instance, the “Company Page” must be public.55 LinkedIn allows something
similar for a company wishing to promote and market itself, along with analogous
parameters for the company’s use of the service.56 LinkedIn and Facebook clearly
differentiate between individual and company accounts, and have entirely separate
agreements for the two.
¶25
In addition, the mere assertion of company ownership may violate various SNS
policies. Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities states, “You will not
facilitate or encourage any violations of this Statement or our policies,”57 and its NonSolicitation Policy states, “You will not solicit login information or access an account
belonging to someone else.”58 Moreover, when a company seizes control of an exemployee’s account, the ex-employee’s connections never agreed to be part of the new
user’s network, which contradicts Facebook’s policy that “[Facebook] will only process
name changes . . . that do not result in a misleading or unintended connection.”59 Further,
LinkedIn requires members to access only their accounts, keep all passwords
confidential, and not impersonate others,60 and forbids uploading anything that “[f]alsely
states, impersonates or otherwise misrepresents your identity.”61 Twitter’s Impersonation
Policy likewise forbids “portraying another person in a confusing or deceptive manner.”62
Thus, in many ways, even if a company decides not to seize control of an employee’s
account upon termination, the forced-transfer provision itself still violates, either directly
or indirectly, the most prominent SNS user agreements.
¶26
Stated simply, SNS user agreements grant inalienable licenses for individual
account access. Yet, while these provisions are seemingly unambiguous, courts have
either conducted only cursory analysis of the SNS user agreements or simply neglected to
enforce them.63 Even after acknowledging these contractual prohibitions, courts have
53

Facebook Agreement, supra note 51.
Id.
55
See id.
56
See Page Guidelines, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/page_guidelines.php (last visited Sept.
16, 2014).
57
Facebook Agreement, supra note 51.
58
Id.
59
Id.; see infra notes 180–90 and accompanying text (removing a trusted connection and covertly
replacing a company-substitute devalues the professional network).
60
LinkedIn Agreement, supra note 46.
61
Id.
62
Twitter Impersonation Policy, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/18366-impersonationpolicy (last accessed Oct. 13, 2014).
63
See, e.g., Eagle v. Morgan, Civil Action No. 11–4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12,
2013) (refuting the employer’s claims of account for two reasons: there was no written corporate policy
54
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suggested that a company can seize control of an employee’s personal social media
account if a written company policy or employment contract makes this practice
explicit.64
¶27
While the duty of the court is often to balance the interests of the parties, when
unequivocal provisions of a binding contract (between the user and SNS) are ignored, one
might assume that the contract is either not pertinent or that the language of the
agreement is unclear. Yet these contracts unmistakably give not only exclusive-access
rights to the individual members,65 but also openly manifest the impermissibility of
account transfers.66 Why courts seem to give employment contracts more credence than
the SNS contracts is unclear, especially considering the totality of the circumstances
discussed infra Part VII(c). This Comment therefore turns to why courts and
commentators have chosen to grant such little weight to SNS agreements. The most
relevant case—Eagle v. Morgan—best illustrates both the contractual asymmetries and
legal confusion surrounding social media in this context.
III.

EAGLE V. MORGAN: JUDICIAL DEFERENCE FOR EMPLOYERS
A.

Facts and Holding

¶28

The defendant, Edcomm Inc. (Edcomm), took control of a former chief executive’s
LinkedIn account following her involuntary termination.67 Dr. Eagle, the former
president and cofounder of the recently acquired Edcomm, had created a LinkedIn
account in 2009, which she used to promote the company, foster her reputation in the
banking industry, and build a network of personal and professional contacts.68
¶29
After the acquisition, Edcomm’s new management team promulgated a revised
social media policy.69 Management urged all employees to create LinkedIn accounts, and
suggested the material that should be included in employees’ profiles, but did not
explicitly require employees to create accounts, and never paid for LinkedIn’s
“Premium” services.70 Importantly, Edcomm never memorialized this policy in writing.71
Nevertheless, Edcomm believed it retained the right to claim ownership of an employee’s
LinkedIn account upon termination.72 Edcomm concluded that this practice was

mandating this practice and “the LinkedIn User Agreement clearly indicated that the individual user owned
the account”); Phonedog v. Kravitz, No. C 11–03474 MEJ., 2011 WL 5415612, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8,
2011) (acknowledging that “Phonedog has adequately alleged that it owns or has the right to possess the
account” after receiving testimony that Twitter’s terms stated otherwise).
64
See Eagle, 2013 WL 943350, at *16.
65
See LinkedIn Agreement, supra note 46 (emphasis added) (“You agree to: . . . not sell, trade, or
transfer LinkedIn account to another party.”).
66
See Eagle, 2013 WL 943350, at *16, for dicta suggesting that the company may have been able to
assert ownership over Dr. Eagle’s LinkedIn account if an explicit, written corporate policy existed stating
such a company practice.
67
See Eagle, 2013 WL 943350, at *2.
68
Id. at *1.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
See id.
72
Id.
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permissible if they replaced a former employee’s name and identity with the new account
holder’s information.73
¶30
Immediately following Dr. Eagle’s termination, Edcomm seized control of her
LinkedIn account.74 Edcomm allegedly instructed Dr. Eagle’s former assistant, who had
helped Dr. Eagle manage her social media accounts, to sign into her account and change
the password.75 While a few identifying features were not deleted, such as Dr. Eagle’s
awards and recognitions, Edcomm personnel changed the name on the account and
position held to match the new CEO’s identity.76 Dr. Eagle quickly realized she could no
longer access her account and that the identifying information had changed, which led to
the eventual lawsuit.77
¶31
The court held that Dr. Eagle failed to meet her burden of proof against Edcomm
for identity theft, tortious interference with contract, conversion, civil conspiracy, and
aiding and abetting.78 However, the court found that Edcomm had used her name without
authorization in violation of Pennsylvania law, misappropriated her identity, and
tortiously invaded her privacy.79 But the court did not award compensatory damages
because Dr. Eagle was unable to show any specific, quantifiable financial loss in the three
weeks without access to her account.80 Further, because the court felt that Edcomm could
have reasonably inferred that they were acting lawfully, it found that punitive damages
were similarly unjustified.81
¶32
The court attempted to mesh traditional common law doctrines and state statutes to
form the basis for its decision. Because she was well known in the banking industry, the
company had violated Dr. Eagle’s right of publicity when it used her LinkedIn account
for commercial gain.82 Moreover, if someone had searched online for Dr. Eagle during
the exclusion period, instead of finding her, the Internet user would have found her
replacement.83 Among other reasons, the fact that Edcomm benefited from Dr. Eagle’s
name and reputation led the court to determine that Edcomm wrongfully seized Dr.
Eagle’s LinkedIn account.84

73

Id.
Id. at *3.
75
Id.
76
Id. A previous court had granted summary judgment in favor of Edcomm for Dr. Eagle’s claims under
the CFAA and the Lanham Act. Eagle v. Morgan, Civil Action No. 11–4303, 2012 WL 4739436, at *9
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012), aff’d, Eagle v. Morgan, Civil Action No. 11–4303, 2013 WL 943350 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 12, 2013). The court dismissed the CFAA claim because “potential business opportunities” were too
“speculative . . . [and] not compensable under the CFAA.” Id. at *5. The court dismissed the Lanham Act
claims because the changed account did not create confusion as to the identity of the account holder. Id. at
*7. Rather, while an Internet search led those looking for Dr. Eagle to her replacement, the confusion only
resulted as to how the user found her replacement. Id. And since Edcomm changed the identifying
information, Edcomm did not try to “pass off” Dr. Eagle as still an employee at Edcomm. Id.
77
Id. at *6.
78
Id. at *17.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at *15.
82
Id. at *8.
83
Id.
84
Id.
74
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Most important for this Comment, the court in Eagle suggested, inter alia, but for
the absence of a written policy specifically asserting the right to take the social media
account, the company could have prevailed.85 Subsequent commentary has identified this
factor—the lack of an explicit statement asserting company ownership of employee
social media accounts—as the foundation for restrictive social media policies. In addition
to such social media policies, many suggest that courts are more likely to enforce these
employment provisions if certain conditions are met, such as whether:
(1) the employer paid the . . . fees; (2) the employer dictated the precise
terms of the employee’s account; (3) the employee acted expressly on
behalf of the employer due to her position, role, or responsibility; [and] (4)
the social media account was developed and built through investment of
the employer’s time and resources.86
While these factors were merely alluded to in dicta, they support the increasingly popular
opinion that an explicitly restrictive social media policy mitigates the risk of future
litigation and allows companies to maintain access to and control over individualmember social media accounts.87 Ultimately, if companies take heed and adopt these
suggestions, more and more employees will lose a valuable professional resource upon
termination.
B.

¶34

Criticism: Common Law Application and Damages Rationale

Eagle v. Morgan exemplifies the unsettled relationship between social media and
the law. The court rightfully relied on recent precedent and traditional legal doctrines to
reach its holding. However, the result is seemingly contradictory.88 Edcomm intentionally
violated the law to gain a commercial advantage to Dr. Eagle’s detriment, yet Dr. Eagle
recovered no damages because she could not prove actual loss during the time Edcomm
wrongfully excluded her from the account.89 Moreover, although the facts are somewhat
unclear, Dr. Eagle was unable to retrieve any messages from the time Edcomm had
control of her account.90 Keeping in mind that Dr. Eagle’s LinkedIn profile was often the
only means for clients to contact her,91 for Dr. Eagle to recover damages, she needed to
show—with certainty—that an individual wishing to complete a transaction was unable
85

Id.
Wayne Chang & Paul Cowie, Who Owns Your Online Persona?, 18 CYBERSPACE LAW. 7, 7 (2013).
“The lesson [from Eagle] is clear: Employers wishing to protect social media accounts which they view as
company marketing and branding should act now and introduce clear policies regarding ownership.” Id.
87
See Jodka, supra note 8, at 1 (suggesting companies draft clear corporate policies that assert
ownership over all social media accounts used in relation to employment and that employee access will
cease upon termination); Kasarjian, supra note 22, at 20 (suggesting employers draft specific contracts
because “[i]t is important to note at the outset who owns and has a right to view/use information,
communications, and even accounts—such as LinkedIn”).
88
Eagle, 2013 WL 943350, at *17 (“[T]he outcome of this case results in somewhat of a mixed bag for
both sides.”).
89
Id.
90
Id. at *3.
91
Id. at *4 (discussing how 70% of Dr. Eagle’s average annual sales came from existing contacts).
86
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to contact her through LinkedIn sometime during the twenty-four days that she was
excluded from the account.92 This is like asking a man without a telephone to prove how
many phone calls he has missed.
¶35
Specifically, the court’s comparison of social media to dissimilar technologies
shows the inherent challenges associated with the application of archaic doctrines to
novel innovation. For instance, the court rightfully asserted that conversion claims in
Pennsylvania only apply to tangible chattels or intangible chattels that can be “merged in,
or identified with, a single document.”93 In turn, the court categorized the LinkedIn
account as something similar to software, domain names, and satellite signals, all of
which are intangible chattels not subject to conversion.94
¶36
But these comparisons are problematic. The court focused on examples involving
the wrongful taking of sharable technology, which if used by many people concurrently,
only marginally diminishes the chattel’s value, if at all.95 For instance, the Eagle court
cited Apparel Business Systems, LLC v. Tom James Co., which dealt with the wrongful
copying of software, to justify finding that a LinkedIn account, like software, qualifies as
an intangible chattel not subject to conversion.96 Yet the copying of software does not
preclude the rightful owner from using or selling the product, whereas the loss of access
to Dr. Eagle’s account eliminated her ability to receive benefits stemming from her
reputation and identity on LinkedIn.
¶37
Further, while social media users often share information publically, only the SNS
and individual licensee have the right to access an account.97 This confers the right to
exclude others. The licensing agreement explicitly grants exclusive, inalienable access
rights, and clearly defines a contractual relationship between only the individual user and
the SNS.98 In other words, the intangible chattel (the LinkedIn account) could “be merged
in, or identified with” the SNS user agreement—a single document.99 Unlike
inexhaustible satellite signals100 or transferable domain names,101 SNS agreements grant
individual users the exclusive right to exclude others from accounts solely attributed to
that user’s identity. However, these inapt comparisons were the court’s only options
because, realistically, social media’s use in the workplace and its attendant value is
unprecedented.

92

Id. at *13.
Id. at *10 (quoting Giordano v. Claudio, 714 F. Supp. 2d 508, 524 (E.D. Pa. 2010)).
94
See id.
95
See, e.g., Robert D. Haymer, Who Owns the Air: Unscrambling the Satellite Viewing Rights Dilemma,
20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 145, 151 (1986) (describing satellite signals as technically inexhaustible).
96
Eagle, 2013 WL 943350, at *10 (citing Apparel Bus. Sys. v. Tom James Co., Civil Action No. 06–
1092, 2008 WL 858754, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2008)).
97
See, e.g., Facebook Agreement, supra note 51; LinkedIn Agreement, supra note 46; Twitter Terms,
supra note 45.
98
See, e.g., Facebook Agreement, supra note 51; LinkedIn Agreement, supra note 46; Twitter Terms,
supra note 45.
99
Eagle, 2013 WL 943350, at *10.
100
See Haymer, supra note 95 (comparing satellite signals to wild animals).
101
See Introduction to Buying and Selling Domain Names, PCNAMES.COM, http://www.pcnames.com/
Articles/An-Introduction-to-Buying-and-Selling-Domain-Names (last visited Feb. 28, 2014); cf. LinkedIn
Agreement, supra note 46 (forbidding transfer or sale of accounts).
93
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¶38

In addition, the court refused to award compensatory damages because Dr. Eagle
was unable to prove that Edcomm’s actions caused her to lose any specific clients. In the
weeks following her termination, when Dr. Eagle lost access to her LinkedIn account, she
could not identify any individuals who were looking for her online and unable to find
her.102 Instead, Dr. Eagle relied on a retroactive formula that used the average amount of
revenue generated through her LinkedIn network to calculate a loss of between $248,000
and $500,000.103 The court found this evaluation too uncertain.104 Dr. Eagle also failed to
prove a causal link between the average loss and the defendant’s actions.105
¶39
While requiring a “reasonable certainty” of damages is a well-established legal
maxim, requiring Dr. Eagle to identify specific transactions to recover damages ignores
the complexities of social media’s commercial value. In many ways, social media’s value
is analogous to the value of traditional advertising. Ordinarily, an advertiser cannot track
revenue generated from a single advertisement.106 Companies normally measure an
advertisement’s value not in actual revenue, but through more holistic methods.107 For
instance, “effective advertising frequency” evaluates the amount of times a consumer
views an advertisement and how that frequency correlates to an eventual purchase.108
Similar methodologies look at how exposure indirectly leads to financial gain.109 Thus,
analogous to social media networks, an advertisement’s value stems from repeated, longterm exposure—not specific, identifiable transactions.110 In this context, the more a user
actively interacts with her online community, the higher the likelihood for economic gain.
The widespread and recurrent interaction through social media can be highly valuable,
yet at the same time mostly unquantifiable, which makes the Eagle court’s requirement
that Dr. Eagle identify the loss of specific transactions highly prejudicial.
¶40
Simply stated, how could Dr. Eagle realistically show this loss if she could neither
access her account nor retrieve past messages? The court reasoned that if someone really
wanted to contact her, the Internet user would have “sought out other ways to reach
her.”111 But what if someone initially tried to communicate with her, and after no
102

Eagle, 2013 WL 943350, at *13.
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
See Robert Bruce, Traditional Advertising Is Truly Dead, COPYBLOGGER, http://www.copyblogger.
com/advertising-is-dead/ (last updated Mar. 24, 2013, 9:46 AM).
107
See, e.g., Roy Williams, How to Track Ad Results, ENTREPRENEUR, http://www.entrepreneur.com/
article/159392 (last visited Aug. 26, 2014); Phil Fernandez, 4 Ways Marketers Can Drive Revenue—and
Prove It, FAST CO. (Jan. 10, 2012, 12:05 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/1807078/4-ways-marketerscan-drive-revenue-and-prove-it.
108
See Molly Elmore, The Effect of Repeated Exposure to Advertising over Time, INSIGHT EXPRESS,
https://www.insightexpress.com/docs/default-source/white-papers/the-effect-of-frequency-over-time.pdf?
sfvrsn=2 (last visited Oct. 19, 2014) (“When planning media in a digital environment, frequency of
exposure has long been known to be an important variable.”).
109
See id.; cf. Eric Clemons, Why Advertising Is Failing on the Internet, TECH CRUNCH (Mar. 22, 2009),
http://techcrunch.com/2009/03/22/why-advertising-is-failing-on-the-internet/ (describing advertising that
allows for “experience and participation in a virtual community” as the most effective form of online
advertising).
110
See 3 ALLAN D. WINDT, Advertising Injury Coverage, in INS. CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 11:29 (6th ed.
2014) (describing “advertising injury” as incorporating elements of unfair competition and invasion of
privacy).
111
Eagle v. Morgan, Civil Action No. 11–4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013).
103
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response, decided to take his business elsewhere? In a saturated marketplace, where
companies increasingly vie for a larger slice of the pie, is the intentional and wrongful
elimination of a resource that has a longstanding, revenue-generating track record not
enough of a hindrance to justify at least a “reasonably fair basis” for recovery?112
Ultimately, Eagle illustrates the unique intersection of social media and the law, which
often requires solutions that do not exist within traditional legal frameworks.
IV. PRIVACY & PUBLICITY RIGHTS: SUPPORT FOR EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
¶41

Forced-transfer provisions implicate privacy concerns and the common law right of
publicity. Regarding privacy, while social media usage is inherently public, certain
aspects of an individual-user account, such as the ability to send and store messages,
retain a very personal quality. However, courts and lawmakers have been reluctant to
address privacy in the workplace, especially when new technology is involved.113 At first
blush, the court’s analysis of whether Edcomm invaded Dr. Eagle’s right of privacy
provides the best judicial guidance. In the end, though, privacy law falls short.
¶42
Part IV first explores the origin and evolution of the right of privacy. This provides
helpful background for an analysis of Dr. Eagle’s “successful” claims, the Eagle court’s
application of various common law doctrines, and ultimately, privacy law’s failure to
provide adequate guidance in this context. Part IV concludes by evaluating the
expectation of privacy generally.
A.

The Right of Privacy in Eagle

The right of privacy is a relatively new concept.114 Published in 1890, Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis’s seminal article—The Right of Privacy—first described this
interest as the right “to be let alone.”115 More than half a century later, William Prosser
built upon Messrs. Warren and Brandeis’s analysis when he divided privacy interests into
four separate categories.116 Almost all states have adopted Prosser’s categories, often
codifying them as distinct torts.117 Common law has expanded upon these interests,
creating new causes of action under “the rubric of privacy.”118 However, applying this
right and defining its contours has proven difficult.
¶44
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for invasion of
privacy by appropriation of name or likeness in 1976.119 Pennsylvania also recognizes a
¶43

112

Id. at *13.
See infra Part IV(b). See generally Stratton, supra note 17 (discussing the constitutional right to
information privacy with regard to public employees’ social media login information).
114
Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
115
Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
116
See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
117
See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 1887, 1904 (2010).
118
Id. at 1907.
119
See Vogel v. W. T. Grant Co., 327 A.2d 133 (Pa. 1974); see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad.
Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (recognizing the distinction between the right of publicity tort and the traditional
invasion of privacy tort).
113
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cause of action for invasion of privacy by misappropriation of publicity.120 But while the
right of publicity technically falls within the bounds of privacy law, it “may be regarded
as the reverse side of the coin of privacy.”121 As such, the right of publicity has been
defined as “the right to control the commercial use” of an identity, focusing on the value
misappropriated rather than any harm done to a “person’s mental psyche.”122 This
distinction is due to the nature of the right of publicity123 and the lack of traditional legal
norms to protect “an axiom of the most fundamental nature, that every person is entitled
to the fruit of his labors unless there are important countervailing public policy
considerations.”124
¶45
Like many states, Pennsylvania codified the right of publicity with a commercialadvantage requirement. Thus, for a claimant to meet her burden of proof, she must show
that the wrongful act was committed for commercial gain.125 In contrast, the tort of
invasion of privacy by misappropriation of name or likeness does not require that a
claimant prove a “commercial benefit.”126 The court in Eagle recognized these two
distinct torts and held that Edcomm had violated both.127 Yet Edcomm’s culpable
behavior did not lead to financial repercussions.128
¶46
In this context, the damages assessment in Eagle prohibitively weakened privacy
protection. Referring to the fact that individuals searching for Dr. Eagle would
unknowingly be led to her replacement, the court stated that “[s]uch a scenario could be
deemed to be ‘appropriat[ing] to [Edcomm’s] own use or benefit the reputation, prestige,
social or commercial standing, public interest or other values of plaintiff’s name.’”129
However, although misappropriation of name or likeness protects an interest more akin to
a property right,130 the court focused only on Dr. Eagle’s inability to show any specific
lost profits. Yet for nearly twenty-four days, Dr. Eagle’s replacement benefitted from the
exposure of the professional network that Dr. Eagle had built.131 As discussed previously,
similar to advertising, Edcomm profited from the indirect, repeated contact with Dr.
120

Compare 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8316 (2003), and BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)
(defining “Invasion of Privacy by Appropriation” as “protect[ing] one’s property right to the economic
benefits flowing from the commercial use of one’s face or name”), with Lewis v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 527 F.
Supp. 2d 422, 429 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (rejecting the argument that “the cause of action for invasion of privacy
by misappropriation of identity has been ‘subsumed’ by [§] 8316” in that it still does not require the
misappropriated use to be commercial).
121
Melvin B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 L. & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 203 (1954), reprinted
in NIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT AND OTHER ASPECTS OF ENTERTAINMENT
LITIGATION INCLUDING UNFAIR COMPETITION, DEFAMATION, PRIVACY 1249 (8th ed., 2012).
122
Thomas Phillip Boggess V, Cause of Action for an Infringement of the Right of Publicity, in 31
CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 121 (2006).
123
See Nimmer, supra note 121, at 1257 (describing right of publicity as “the right of each person to
control and profit from the publicity values which he has created or purchased”).
124
Id.
125
See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8316 (2003).
126
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. a (1977) (“[T]he right created by it is in the
nature of a property right, for the exercise of which an exclusive license may be given to a third person,
which will entitle the licensee to maintain an action to protect it.”).
127
See Eagle v. Morgan, Civil Action No. 11–4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013).
128
See id. at *17.
129
Id. at *8.
130
See § 652C cmt. a.
131
See Eagle, 2013 WL 943350, at *8.
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Eagle’s online community. In other words, Edcomm’s culpable behavior resulted in
unjust enrichment, albeit indirectly, from the use of Dr. Eagle’s account; an account
founded upon valuable personal connections effectuated by Dr. Eagle’s identity and
corresponding reputation.132 In sum, Edcomm benefited from both the court’s ill-fitted
damages requirement and the complexities of social media’s commercial value in the
workplace.
¶47
Although some privacy rights recognize the inherent value in an individual’s name
and reputation, imposing such a high threshold for certainty of damages likely precludes
recovery for most claimants in this context, even after proving a clear privacy violation.
A social media account is not an interactive website for consumers to purchase a product.
Nor is it an email account that clients may send official documentation identifying a
purchase.133 Social media is a medium of personal expression that allows individuals to
interact. Dr. Eagle lost this potential for interaction because Edcomm wished to insert
itself into her online community.
¶48
In the end, privacy protection falls short. The difficulty in proving with certainty
that direct, identifiable damages resulted from the defendant’s conduct realistically
precludes plaintiffs from recovering damages for the loss of access to social media
accounts. And because the interest protected is similar to a property right, it is fully
licensable, which negates its applicability when an employment contract explicitly grants
these rights to an employer.134
B.

The Expectation of Privacy in Social Media

¶49

The U.S. Supreme Court recently eschewed a similar issue when asked to
determine whether an employer violated an employee’s expectation of privacy when the
employer searched through personal text messages on an employer-provided pager.135
Recognizing the difficulty in determining privacy rights in an evolving technological
landscape, the Court stated that these expectations “will be shaped by those changes or
the degree to which society will be prepared to recognize those expectations as
reasonable.”136 Thus, while the Court’s reluctance to address workplace privacy leaves
questions unanswered, its acknowledgment that privacy rights are determined by societal
expectations leaves our issue within the purview of the lower courts.
¶50
Courts need to ask whether a reasonable employee would expect to lose her social
media account upon termination. For instance, as qualified supra,137 if a company hires
an employee to manage its social media platforms, and the employee creates accounts in
the name of the company, then that employee should not reasonably expect to retain
access to those accounts upon termination. However, when an employee uses her
132

See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text.
Cf. AFL Phila. LLC v. Krause, 639 F. Supp. 2d 512, 518 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (holding that defendant’s
wrongful use of former employee’s email address caused reputational damage).
134
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. a (1977).
135
Patricia Sánchez Abril, Avner Levin & Alissa Del Riego, Blurred Boundaries: Social Media Privacy
and the Twenty-First-Century Employee, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 63, 65 (2012) (citing City of Ontario, Cal. v.
Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010)).
136
Id.
137
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
133
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individual-member account for business purposes, her privacy expectations may
reasonably change, especially given the nebulous relation between the social and
professional use of social media.138 And even if an employee signed a contract that
included a forced-transfer provision, the equitable considerations in the
employer/employee context discussed infra Part VII(c) support the idea that social media
accounts created in her name and associated with her identity are nevertheless
inalienable.139
V.

TRADE-SECRET LAW: MORE THAN JUST AN ELECTRONIC ROLODEX

¶51

In contrast, while individual social media accounts prompt some privacy concerns,
they are inherently a very public mode of self-expression. Yet some commentators have
looked to trade-secret law for solutions.140 In other words, an employer might assert
ownership of employee social media accounts following termination by claiming that
these accounts and the attendant networks qualify as trade secrets, and thus belong to the
company.141 While trade-secret law varies across states, “any information that can be
used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and
secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others,” broadly defines
what typically constitutes a trade secret.142 This expansive definition includes any
information that could provide a competitive advantage that falls outside copyright or
patent protection.143
¶52
But information that is industry knowledge or “readily ascertainable” falls outside
trade-secret protection.144 The information does not need to be technical for trade-secret
protection, but must not easily derive from public information.145 For instance, the
Supreme Court of Georgia described trade-secret law as a means of protecting employer
property.146 Specifically, the Georgia Court held that a departing employee has the right

138

See Cosentino, supra note 29; Brutocao, supra note 30.
See Abril et al., supra note 135, at 108, for a survey conducted of mostly 18–24 year olds, where
“Millennial respondents displayed a clear discomfort with the idea of information flowing across contexts.
Three-fourths found it inappropriate for an employer to check employee off-duty conduct via social
networks. More than half (56%) objected to the practice of social media background checks.”
140
See, e.g., Jasmine McNealy, Who Owns Your Friends?: Phonedog v. Kravitz and Business Claims of
Trade Secret in Social Media Information, 39 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 30 (2013).
141
See id.
142
Id. at 34 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995)). See UNIF. TRADE
SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985) (“Trade Secret means information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value,
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts
that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”).
143
McNealy, supra note 140, at 34–35.
144
See id.; Jodka, supra note 8 (describing how the public nature of social media negates trade secret
protection because trade secrets “must be (1) maintained in confidence, (2) have commercial value from
not being generally known, and (3) not be readily ascertainable by proper means”).
145
See, e.g., Eagle v. Morgan, Civil Action No.11–4303, 2011 WL 6739448, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22,
2011), aff’d, Eagle v. Morgan, Civil Action No. 11–4303, 2013 WL 943350 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013); see
also Jodka, supra note 8.
146
See Avnet, Inc. v. Wyle Labs., Inc., 437 S.E.2d 302, 304 (Ga. 1993).
139
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to take all knowledge gained during employment, information not belonging to the
employer, and that customers (not being property) are not trade secrets.147
¶53
Further, when an employee expends a significant amount of effort in creating a
client list, and the employer allows the employee to maintain the list throughout
employment, courts are less likely to find the existence of a trade secret.148 Identifying
where this relationship exists, whether between the employee or the employer and the
customer list, is essential to typical trade-secret-protection analysis.149
¶54
With rare exceptions,150 individual social media accounts should fall outside the
scope of trade-secrets law.151 First, much of the value associated with a professional
network stems from the very public nature of the relationship.152 Finding that these user
accounts are eligible for trade-secret protection seems entirely antithetical to social
media’s purpose in the workplace. Simply stated, professional networking requires public
exposure.153 Second, unlike someone responsible for managing a public page in the name
of a company, the individual user is solely responsible for building and maintaining her
professional network.
¶55
Social media’s value arises from the relationships existing amongst a professional
network. As discussed infra Part VII(a), the quality of these connections likely enhances
social media’s value more so than the quantity. Although a user’s account can function
like a rolodex, storing and organizing beneficial contact information, the interactive
nature of social media distinguishes it from a client list, which is potentially subject to
trade-secret protection. When someone initiates contact through social media, the
individual accepting the request does so believing that he or she is connecting with the
employee, not the employer. In sum, these relationships exist between individuals, not
companies, which removes professional networks from the ambit of trade-secret
protection.154

147

Id.
See Jenifer A. Maygar, Protecting Company Information from Ex-Employees, FINDLAW (Mar. 26,
2008), http://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/protecting-customer-infromation-from-exemployees.html (citing Robert S. Weiss Inc. & Assocs. v. Wiederlight, 546 A.2d 216, 224 (Conn. 1988))
(“Connecticut courts have found that employees in a particular industry know what public resources to
consult in order to identify their customers, and therefore, courts do not consider customer information a
trade secret.”).
149
See id.
150
See McNealy, supra note 140, at 37–45. Looking to some common exceptions, if an account’s
privacy settings are strict, the client list is significantly detailed, and the employer shows that adequate time
and resources were expended by the company in establishing and protecting the list, a social media account
could arguably fall within the protection of trade-secrets law. Id.
151
See, e.g., Sasqua Grp., Inc. v. Courtney, No. CV 10–528(ADS)(AKT), 2010 WL 3613855, at *9
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2010) (discussing how the public nature of the LinkedIn network removes it from tradesecret protection); see also Jodka, supra note 8 (referring to a British court that held a LinkedIn network
was a trade secret similar to a protected client list).
152
See McNealy, supra note 140, at 50.
153
See, e.g., LinkedIn Agreement, supra note 46 (describing LinkedIn as the world’s largest professional
network).
154
See McNealy, supra note 140, at 44 (describing court reasoning that identified the personal
relationships between a former employee and past clients that removed future professional contact between
the parties from trade-secrets protection).
148
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VI. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE TRENDS: THE PROGRESSION OF SOCIAL MEDIA RIGHTS
IN THE WORKPLACE
¶56

The decision in Eagle illustrates how established legal principles often fail to
provide adequate solutions for disputes concerning new technology. However,
subsequent commentary continuously attempts to identify old frameworks for these
modern issues. For instance, recognizing the inapplicability of intellectual property law in
this context, some have attempted to address social media access rights through the
CFAA, a decades-old statute originally drafted to combat computer hacking.155
A.

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)

Some have identified the CFAA as a possible solution.156 Originally enacted in
1986, Congress has amended the “anti-hacking” statute multiple times to “keep pace with
technological development.”157 Providing for both a private right of action and potential
criminal liability, Congress intended the CFAA to deter and punish hackers attempting to
gain access to protected computers for economic gain.158 Courts and Congress have
expanded the CFAA’s applicability to cover an employee who wrongfully accesses a
company computer to gain an economic advantage.159
¶58
Additionally, since the CFAA applies to access rights, it more easily fits with social
media ownership-rights analysis because there is no need to manipulate intellectual
property law.160 In other words, the fact that neither employer nor employee truly owns
the account matters far less under the CFAA. Pertinent to our analysis, the CFAA states,
“Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation . . . may maintain a civil
action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other
equitable relief.”161 Further, the CFAA broadly defines “loss” to include “any revenue
lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of
service.”162 Thus, at first blush, the CFAA appears to provide potential relief for claims
similar to that of Dr. Eagle’s.
¶59
However, the CFAA is less helpful in determining access rights for individualmember social media accounts. First, although the CFAA could arguably cover a
situation where an ex-employee retains access to or changes the password of an account
created in the name of the company, it is harder to justify its applicability to individualmember accounts. The crux of a CFAA claim is the extent to which the usage goes
beyond the authorization granted to the employee by the employer.163 Regarding
¶57

155

See Miao, supra note 28.
See id. at 1017.
157
Id. at 1033, 1061; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1030 (2012).
158
See Miao, supra note 28, at 1033.
159
See id. at 1024 for a discussion of Ardis Health, LLC v. Nankivell, No. 11 Civ. 5013(NRB), 2011
WL 4965172, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2011), where an ex-employee hired to manage a company’s social
media account was ordered to return the login information to her former employer because the employer
“own[ed] the rights to the Access Information.”
160
Id. at 1060.
161
18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2012).
162
§ 1030(e)(11) (emphasis added).
163
See id.; Hernacki, supra note 26, at 1547–48 (arguing CFAA’s scope should be limited to original
156
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individual-user accounts, the agreement made between the SNS and the user defines this
scope of authorization.164 As the “exclusive owner” of the account, “individually bound”
by the agreement, the user’s right to access an account is paramount to all but the true
owner’s—the SNS.165 Until an SNS deems otherwise, an employee is authorized to use
that service, even if the employee violates the accepted terms of service.
¶60
Moreover, the CFAA has typically applied to situations where an employee takes
proprietary information without permission.166 But even if a company has effectively
stored contact information within a company’s protected computer system, it must have
received that data from an individual user’s social media account. And not only is the
employee initially responsible for gathering this information, but also a professional
network consists of people, not property, making the CFAA as analogously inapplicable
as trade-secret law. In other words, these personal connections are anything but
proprietary information.167
¶61
Discussed supra Part II, an SNS retains the right to suspend account access at its
sole discretion. Although employees might use company computers to gain access to
their accounts throughout the course of employment, only the SNS operates the platform,
and the SNS user agreement defines the extent of user authorization.168 Thus if the CFAA
applies at all in this context, it is the SNS, not the company, that could pursue a private
right of action against a user. However, as seen in Eagle, courts have increasingly applied
a narrower interpretation of the CFAA, which requires an actual “hacking” violation and
implies a more stringent threshold for recoverable damages.169
¶62
In this same vein, courts have begun to question the enforceability of the CFAA in
employer-employee disputes, creating a circuit split.170 In 2012, the Ninth and Fourth
Circuit Courts interpreted the “exceeds authorized access” and “without authorization”
language narrowly, pointing out that the purpose of the CFAA is to combat hacking, not
to hold employees liable for any slight infringement of an employer’s computer-use

legislative goal of drafting an “anti-hacking” statute).
164
See LinkedIn Agreement, supra note 46 (asserting agreement is between the user and LinkedIn,
notwithstanding the fact that a person may be acting on behalf of a company).
165
See id.
166
Miao, supra note 28, at 1054; see, e.g., EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 580
(1st Cir. 2001) (finding ex-employee, acting beyond his authority defined by a confidentiality agreement,
violated the CFAA when he used a “scraper” to gather information from former employer’s website); see
also United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that unintended use of company’s
computer network, entirely unrelated to defendant’s prior job function, amounted to a CFAA violation).
167
See Thomas E. Booms, Note, Hacking into Federal Court: Employee “Authorization” Under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 543, 560 (2011) (“[W]hile the presence of an
employment agreement may bolster the company’s case against a rogue employee, it is not dispositive.”);
see also Creative Computing v. Getloaded.com, LLC, 386 F.3d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding CFAA
violation when defendant hired competitor’s employee to login to plaintiff’s protected website and
download a confidential client list).
168
See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
169
Eagle v. Morgan, No. Civ. 11–4303, 2012 WL 4739436, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012) (“[Dr. Eagle]
claims that she was denied potential business opportunities as a result of Edcomm’s unauthorized access
and control over the account. Loss of business opportunities . . . is simply not compensable under the
CFAA.”), aff’d, Eagle v. Morgan, No. Civ. 11–4303, 2013 WL 943350 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013); see
Mooney, supra note 31.
170
See Cosentino, supra note 29.
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policy.171 Therefore, in these jurisdictions, the misuse of information by an employee will
not meet the revised statutory threshold for civil liability if the employer gave the
employee access to that information in the course of her employment.172
¶63
Although other circuits have yet to join the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, district
courts in the Second, Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have adopted this narrow
interpretation “with the expectation that their respective circuits will follow.”173 Thus,
following this judicial trend, the prospect of the CFAA assisting in the interpretation of
social media ownership rights seems unpromising because of not only its unsettled state,
but also the fact that courts are increasingly applying the narrower interpretation, as seen
in Eagle.174
B.
¶64

State and National Legislation

Recent legislative trends point to the increasing preference for employee privacy
protection in social media. For example, six states—California, Delaware, Illinois,
Maryland, Michigan, and New Jersey—have recently passed laws that prohibit employers
from asking for social media passwords,175 and analogous legislation has been introduced
or is pending in twenty-eight states.176 Similarly, § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act,
which protects employees’ rights to engage in protected, concerted activity, has provided
relief for employees when an employer terminates or reprimands an employee because of
certain statements made online.177 Specifically, in a May 2012 memorandum, the
National Labor Relations Board issued a statement extending § 7 protection for
employees’ social media usage.178 With recent fears relating to privacy exacerbated by
various controversies (e.g., the NSA’s mass surveillance of phone records), nothing
suggests that legislation geared towards protecting social media privacy rights is likely to
cease.179

171

Audra A. Dial & John M. Moye, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and Disloyal Employees: How
Far Should the Statute Go to Protect Employers from Trade Secret Theft?, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1447, 1450
(2013) (citing WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, LLC, v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012) and United
States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012)).
172
See id.; Mooney, supra note 31, at 16 (“Eagle’s disclosure of her password to the employees, who
later accessed her account using the authorized password, foreclosed any such [CFAA] claim.”). But see
NCMIC Fin. Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1058 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (“The legislative history of §
1030(e)(6) supports the broad view.”).
173
See Dial & Moye, supra note 171, at 1457.
174
Mooney, supra note 31.
175
Kasarjian, supra note 22, at 21.
176
Employer Access to Social Media and Passwords, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGS.,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/employer-access-to-socialmedia-passwords-2013.aspx#2014 (last updated Sept. 28, 2014).
177
See Kasarjian, supra note 22.
178
See id.; Alyesha A. Dotson, NLRB Outlines Employers’ Social Media Policies Do’s and Don’ts,
SPILLMAN, THOMAS & BATTLE P.L.L.C (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.spilmanlaw.com/resources/attorneyauthored-articles/labor---employment/nlrb-outlines-employers--social-media-policy-dos-a.
179
See James Hendler, It’s Time to Reform the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, SCI. AM. (Aug. 16,
2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/its-times-reform-computer-fraud-abuse-act/ (proposing a
change to the CFAA’s “draconian measures” following the suicide of Aaron Schwartz, an Internet activist
who committed suicide after being charged with eleven felonies and up to thirty-five years in prison).
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In sum, the inapplicability of traditional legal frameworks combined with these
judicial and legislative trends protecting privacy rights create an opportunity to explore
alternative guidelines. While most legal justifications further muddle social media rights
analysis, the economic and social benefits of social media’s use in the workplace are
clear. Thus, perhaps an analysis focusing on these clear benefits provides instruction.
VII. SOCIAL MEDIA VALUATION: SOCIOECONOMIC RATIONALE

¶66

The proliferation of company policies that include forced-transfer provisions could
substantially hamper social media’s future value, both economically and socially. After
balancing the equities, the negative socioeconomic impact of forced-transfer provisions
should tip the scales in favor of an exclusive judicial rule proscribing this practice.
Further, the potential for social media’s devaluation should prompt SNSs to take action as
well.
¶67
Part VII first argues that empirical evidence and various studies suggest that social
media’s potential financial and social value is not only intrinsically intertwined, but also
wholly dependent on interpersonal connection. Because forced-transfer provisions insert
unknown company representatives into these social networks, in the aggregate, over
commercialization of these once-personal networks will stymie the sharing of ideas,
hindering the corresponding growth of online communities. Part VII(b) next turns to SNS
intervention, and specifically how SNSs can deter this deleterious practice from
negatively affecting SNSs generally. Finally, Part VII(c) suggests that this adverse social
impact should prompt courts to proscribe the enforceability of these overly restrictive
provisions.
A.
¶68

The True Value of Social Media: Online Communities Built on Trust

Social media’s value in the workplace is undeniable. While over 72% of companies
use social media, one study estimates that the potential economic value of social media is
still largely untapped, with trillions of dollars in value unrealized.180 According to the
same study, the biggest challenge in capturing this added value is the difficulty in
establishing workplace conditions that foster collaboration.181 Only through work
environments that encourage participation and embrace trust will communication within
organizations and across enterprises lead to this potential growth.182 Aligning with this
concept, the first section of LinkedIn’s User Agreement explains that the purpose of the
social media platform is to allow people to create a “network of trusted relationships and
groups.”183

180

See SOCIAL ECONOMY, supra note 6.
See id. “The value contribution from improved communication, coordination, and collaboration—
potentially two-thirds of all potential value from use of social technologies in business organizations—is
embedded in these projections.” Id. at 9. While this analysis includes all “social technologies,” even by
more conservative estimates, the potential commercial value of social media is significant. Id.
182
See id.
183
LinkedIn Agreement, supra note 46 (emphasis added).
181
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¶69

Furthermore, LinkedIn’s User Agreement prohibits members from soliciting
unfamiliar connections, making it arguably the most restrictive of the popular SNSs.184
Similarly, Twitter and Facebook explicitly and repeatedly forbid a user from creating
accounts in someone else’s name or misleading others as to his identity.185 Unlike other
areas of the Internet where anonymity flourishes, the personal accountability within a
social media network creates an environment where users are free to develop and share
ideas with trusted connections, thus allowing like-minded communities to form.186
¶70
In fact, many argue that the pitfalls of anonymity pose the biggest threat to
successful online communities.187 For instance, the over commercialization of the oncepopular MySpace arguably caused its failure. Instead of providing a platform for
communities to connect, “MySpace diverted its attention to serving eyeballs to
advertisers and fell even more behind on facilitating the ‘social’ part of social
networking.”188 In other words, SNSs that facilitate the free formation of trusted groups
incent the sharing of ideas and the corresponding growth of the online community.189
¶71
Furthermore, a Cornell study found that the “tendency of an individual to join a
community is influenced not just by the number of friends he or she has within the
community, but also crucially by how those friends are connected to one another.”190
Therefore, in tandem with creating an environment of trust to foster collaboration, the
potential economic value associated with social media’s growth arguably depends not
only on the amount of connections within a network, but also the quality of the
connection among members.191

184

See id.
See Twitter Terms, supra note 45.
186
See Boyd & Ellison, supra note 1, at 219 (“‘[P]ublic displays of connection’ serve as important
identity signals that help people navigate the networked social world, in that an extended network may
serve to validate information presented in profiles.”).
187
See JEREMY KEESHIN, SOCIAL NORMS ON THE WEB: HOW TO CREATE PRODUCTIVE DIGITAL
COMMUNITIES 7 (2010), available at http://thekeesh.com/docs/norms.pdf (“There is a large anti-spam
effort, because spam represents those trying to undermine the community with noise. [SNSs] institute
policies to fight the shortcoming of online communities—mainly anonymity—but succeed in varying
measures.”); see, e.g., Facebook Agreement, supra note 51 (“You will not post unauthorized commercial
communications (such as spam) on Facebook.”); LinkedIn Agreement, supra note 46 (prohibiting spam and
attempting to connect with and/or contact with people who do not know you or “who are unlikely to
recognize you as a known contact”).
188
Chunka Mui, Why Facebook Beat MySpace, and Why MySpace’s Revised Strategy Will Probably
Fail, FORBES (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chunkamui/2011/01/12/why-facebook-beatmyspace-and-why-myspaces-revised-strategy-will-probably-fail/; see Boyd & Ellison, supra note 1, at 22
(“[T]rust and usage goals may affect what people are willing to share—Facebook users expressed greater
trust in Facebook than MySpace users did in MySpace and were thus more willing to share information on
the site.”).
189
Mui, supra note 188 (describing “Reed’s Law,” developed by David Reed of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, as the framework by which SNSs will flourish).
190
LARS BACKSTROM ET AL., DEP’T OF COMPUTER SCI., CORNELL UNIV., GROUP FORMATION IN LARGE
SOCIAL NETWORKS: MEMBERSHIP, GROWTH, AND EVOLUTION 1 (1976), available at http://www.cs.cornell.
edu/~lars/kdd06-comm.pdf.
191
See id. While this Cornell study focuses on offline behavior, many commentators point out the
similarity of group behavior, whether online or not: “The idea that group dynamics and social interaction
follow many of the same rules from offline is well supported.” KEESHIN, supra note 187, at 3. Further, the
saliency of a group—“the amount that users find the group to be self-defining, affects the adherence to
communal norms.” Id.
185
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While most companies use social media, few have specific social media policies in
place. In fact, only within the past few years have social media policies become a focal
point of corporate governance.193 Because of this trend, if these forced-transfer provisions
become a common and enforceable aspect of employment contracts, their adoption could
extend quickly and expansively.194 If this is the case, it will lead to the widespread
transference of social media accounts from original users to company-appointed
substitutes.195 These substitutes will most likely not have personal connections with the
majority of the network. In this same vein, because of the undeniable value stemming
from these personal connections, there is a clear incentive for the employer to conceal or
at least limit public communication of the account holder’s changed identity. Therefore,
while a network may not necessarily lose members, it may lose a portion of its potential
value because the personal connection among members will fray.196
¶73
No longer will the purpose of social media be to create an environment for “trusted
relationships” to form,197 but one where companies may acquire large swaths of
networks, substituting personal connections for data collection or some other commercial
purpose.198 Even though these companies might not be impersonating former employees,
they will be substituting uninvited colleagues into an online community.
¶74
While this may seem hyperbolic, taking into account the increasing rate of career
change among Millennials,199 these policies could lead to the devaluation of social media,
192

192

See Amy Gesenhues, Survey: 71% of Companies Concerned over Social Media Risks, but Only 36%
Provide Employee Training, MKTG. LAND (Sept. 27, 2013, 3:28 PM), http://marketingland.com/survey-71of-companies-concerned-about-social-media-risks-only-36-do-social-media-training-60212 (indicating that
33% of companies surveyed have a social media policy in place); Samuel Axon, Most Companies Don’t
Have a Social Media Policy in Place, MASHABLE (Feb. 3, 2010), http://mashable.com/2010/02/03/socialnetworking-policy/ (noting that 29% of companies in the Americas have a “formal policy” regarding social
media use); see also Kasarjian, supra note 22.
193
See Gesenhues, supra note 192.
194
See id. for analysis of a survey which indicates that while 33% of company respondents had a social
media policy in place, 27% had no social media in place and no plans to adopt one. Accordingly, showing
the potential for widespread adoption of company social media policies, 40% of respondents had plans to
create a social media policy in the near future, or had other related policies. Id.
195
See Susan H. Stephan, Datamining for Gold: Social Media and Social Capital in a Postnational
Global Market, 39 N. KY. L. REV. 163, 167–71 (2012), for a discussion of the potential for corporate and
governmental interference in the global Internet community, namely the increasing corporate interest in
privatizing the Internet. But compare, SOCIAL ECONOMY, supra note 6, at 12, for the proposition that
consumers might benefit economically from data-mining in that “social technologies provide the insights
that allow consumers to purchase goods that are better suited to their needs.”
196
See SOCIAL ECONOMY, supra note 6. The economic potential of social media depends on these
trusted connections. Id. RICK LAWRENCE ET AL., SOCIAL MEDIA ANALYTICS: THE NEXT GENERATION OF
ANALYTICS-BASED MARKETING SEEKS INSIGHTS FROM BLOGS 1 (2010), available at http://www.premmelville.com/publications/sma-orms10.pdf (“In July 2009, a survey conducted by Universal McCann
concluded that 31.7% of more than 200 million bloggers worldwide blog about opinions on products and
brands, and that 71% of all active Internet users read blogs. The 2009 Nielsen Global Online Consumer
Survey of 25,000 Internet users in 50 countries has found 70% of consumers trust opinions posted online
by other consumers.”); BACKSTROM ET AL., supra note 190.
197
See LinkedIn Agreement, supra note 46.
198
See LAWRENCE ET AL., supra note 196, at 26 (describing social media analytics as an emerging
discipline where data-mining and other marketing strategies provide companies the opportunity to leverage
social media to track consumer behavior).
199
See Carl Bialik, Seven Careers in a Lifetime? Think Twice Researchers Say, NUMBERS GUYS BLOG
(Sept. 4, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704206804575468162
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stymieing its growth and decreasing its utility through a steady attrition of reliable
personal networks.200 This could drastically affect not only a crucial form of networking
for businesses, but could also lead to over-commercialization, prompting less usage and
community participation.201 Simply stated, the value of these networks is found not in the
sheer number of members, but rather in the quality of connections fostered through social
media’s usage.
B.

SNS Action: Time to Intervene

¶75

This potential economic degradation should prompt SNSs to take action. However,
since these disputes primarily involve only the employer and employee, judicial
intervention is also necessary. This section proposes that SNSs should draft user
agreements explicitly banning the forced transfer of member accounts, and in the future,
actively pursue legal claims for breach of contract when these forced transfers occur.
Alternatively, SNSs should deactivate accounts that have changed owners. While the
latter is not ideal in that social networks will lose some members, it negates the insertion
of company representatives, thus remedying—albeit partially—the overall negative
impact of these forced-transfer provisions.
¶76
First, although SNS user agreements currently forbid the transferring or selling of
individual accounts, SNSs should expressly prohibit this employment practice, making
judicial enforcement of these provisions less likely. Further, even if SNS user agreements
explicitly prohibit the transfer of an account, the breach does not void the agreement.202
In fact, since these licenses are revocable at the SNS’s sole discretion, a court may
hesitate to grant a user agreement significant weight when there has been a clear breach,
but the SNS has not resorted to self-help.203 After all, forced-transfer provisions violate
the SNS’s policies, and if the SNS is not actively enforcing the terms of its own
agreement, then equitable intervention might be determined unnecessary.204 Thus, SNSs
should legally intervene to enforce the user agreements, further bolstering the legitimacy
of the agreement between the SNS and the user. Up to this point, SNS involvement in
805877990.
200
See KEESHIN, supra note 187, at 15, for a discussion of how honest representation benefits social
media. For the successful development of an online community, “it is important that the users be attached
and invested to their online identity, and that it is an accurate and honest representation of their self.” Id.
201
Id. Self-governing online communities flourish when members are connected to their identities thus
allowing for accountability. Id. “If they become anonymous, then any iterated interactions or punishment is
worthless because they create a new worthless account. A punishment to an anonymous user doesn’t do
anything, and this is why the foundation of a successful social norm system depends on legitimate
identities.” Id. at 14.
202
See LinkedIn Agreement, supra note 46; Twitter Terms, supra note 45; Facebook Agreement, supra
note 51.
203
Courts often require plaintiffs to show that defendant’s intentional inducement of the breach of the
contract rendered performance impossible. Here, the SNS would have standing to sue, but would need to
show actual damages. On the other hand, the employee would have to show not only damages, but also that
the transfer of the account to the employer rendered performance impossible. See M. J. & K. Co. v.
Matthew Bender & Co., 220 A.D.2d 488, 490 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
204
See Eagle v. Morgan, Civil Action No. 11–4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013)
(identifying lack of quantifiable damages for loss of account access); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 70 (2011) (describing Doctrine of Laches as an affirmative defense
barring equitable intervention).
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these lawsuits has not been practical because the expense of litigation far outweighs any
damages in an individual suit. But now, taking into account the negative effects of these
policies in the aggregate, SNSs should be more willing to take action.205
C.

Judicial Intervention: Forced-Transfer Provision Enforceability

¶77

Notwithstanding the fact that SNS user agreements prohibit the transfer of social
media accounts, courts have implied that accounts are indeed alienable. Thus, a judgemade rule proscribing the enforceability of forced-transfer provisions stands as the most
suitable remedy. However, this paternalistic stance, which contradicts traditional
principles of contract law, requires justification found not in the text of these various
contracts, but in equity. In other words, courts should balance the inherent socioeconomic
asymmetries between the employer and employee to evaluate the fundamental fairness of
restrictive social media policies. This Comment concludes that when employers
knowingly induce employees to breach SNS user agreements, courts should acknowledge
the unequal bargaining power between the parties, and thus equitably prohibit the
enforcement of these agreements.
¶78
For instance, the employer’s intentional interference with the SNS user agreement
could be a basis for equitable intervention. When an employment contract compels
account transference upon termination, the employer has induced the employee to breach
his contract with the SNS. In many states, “intentional interference with performance of a
contract by third person” applies when a party has improperly interfered with a contract
or prospective contractual relation with another.206 Thus, if an employee uses social
media at the company’s direction, this common law doctrine applies to the employer
regardless of whether the employee created an account with an SNS before employment
commenced. If the employment contract includes a forced-transfer provision, the
employer intends for an employee to breach certain terms of an already existing, or soonto-be formed, social media contract when that employee leaves the company.207
¶79
When deciding whether an action qualifies as intentional interference with contract,
courts typically consider the relations between the parties and the “social interests in
protecting the freedom of action of the actor.”208 First, a court should note the oftenunequal bargaining power between a jobseeker and potential employer.209 Second, the exemployee would most likely suffer greater proportional harm by losing access to the
professional network.210 For jobseekers, it increases the likelihood of securing suitable
205

See supra text accompanying notes 177–91.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. g (1979); see, e.g., Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S.
121, 126 (1998) (recognizing third-party interference claim with an employment contract as long
established in tort law); Onyeoziri v. Spivok, 44 A.3d 279, 286 (D.C. 2012) (applying factors in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 for tortious intentional interference with contract claim).
207
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
208
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767(e).
209
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767(g); see, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare
Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000) (recognizing the unequal bargaining power between employer and
employee in pre-employment contract negotiation); see also Franklin G. Snyder, The Pernicious Effect of
Employment Relationships on the Law of Contracts, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 33, 34 (2003) (suggesting
employment contracts deal more with questions of status, rather than contractual relations).
210
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766; see also Herron v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 363 P.2d
206
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employment.211 For the recently hired, it expedites the onboarding process.212
Specifically, if a company unexpectedly fires an employee, and the newly terminated
employee does not have an opportunity to collect necessary contact information stored
within an account, the employee experiences the most acute harm, losing an invaluable
professional resource for both successful subsequent employment and the newly
unemployed individual’s job search.213
¶80
The employer, on the other hand, typically has a larger pool of resources to draw
from, along with other means, such as non-compete agreements, to protect its interests.
Companies adopt these forced-transfer provisions because of both the desire for
economic gain and the fear of economic loss. The provisions ensure that the company
will maintain access to a potentially lucrative professional network, while reducing the
likelihood of an ex-employee poaching prospective or existing clients.214 In many ways,
it functions very similarly to a standard, otherwise enforceable, non-compete
agreement.215 However, the existence of a conflicting contract changes the circumstances.
Unlike a non-compete agreement where no prior contract exists, if an employee ever
leaves the company, a forced-transfer provision inevitably leads to a breach of either the
employment contract or the SNS user agreement.
¶81
Although the common law tort of intentional interference with contract varies
across states, and often requires a showing of something similar to malice,216 courts
might be willing to extend the doctrine in this context pursuant to the judiciary’s inherent
equity powers. In sum, taking into account the equitable factors used by courts to
determine liability for this tort, the nature of the employer-employee relationship, and the
social ramifications associated with unemployment, a sympathetic court might choose to
err in favor of employees’ rights. Further, if SNS user agreements explicitly forbid this
employment practice, courts may be even more likely to deem forced-transfer provisions
unenforceable.

310, 312 (Cal. 1961) (balancing “the importance, social and private, of the objective advanced by the
interference against the importance of the interest interfered with, considering all the circumstances
including the nature of the actor’s conduct and the relationship between the parties” to determine whether
tortious intentional interference by a third-party occurred).
211
See Susan Adams, LinkedIn Still Rules as the Top Job Search Technology Tool, Survey Says, FORBES
(Aug. 12, 2013, 6:57 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2013/08/12/linkedin-still-rules-as-thetop-job-search-technology-tool-survey-says/ (“Social [m]edia sites like LinkedIn are the top way to search
for candidates.”).
212
See id.
213
See id.
214
See Parent, supra note 8.
215
See, e.g., Teksystems, Inc. v. Bolton, Civil Action No. RDB–08–3099, 2010 WL 447782, at *5 (D.
Md. Feb. 4, 2010) (discussing possible violation of former employee’s non-compete agreement when he
contacted clients through LinkedIn).
216
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. s (1979) (“There are frequent expressions in
judicial opinions that ‘malice’ is requisite for liability . . . But the context and the course of the decisions
make it clear that what is meant is not malice in the sense of ill will but merely ‘intentional interference
without justification.’”); see, e.g., Hall v. FMR Corp., 667 F. Supp. 2d 185 (D. Mass. 2009); Louis
Schlesinger Co. v. Rice, 72 A.2d 197, 202 (N.J. 1950) (citing Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871))
(“But if [the interference] comes from the merely wanton or malicious acts of others, without the
justification of competition or the service of any interest or lawful purpose, it then stands upon a different
footing.”).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
¶82

By adhering to the terms agreed upon between the individual user and the SNS, a
blanket, judicial prohibition of these forced-transfer employment provisions will allow
social media to reach its full economic and social potential. After balancing the equities,
and taking into account established principles of contract, privacy, and tort law, the
employee’s right to retain social media account access must be assured through judicial
intervention. Although federal legislation could achieve the same result, the judiciary’s
inherent equity powers give judges the discretion necessary to quickly and efficiently
reach the most suitable solution.
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